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Abstract

We can observe the following challenges of managing authorization for the composite web service-Order
Service in Tom & Brothers:

A web service can be composed of multiple component web services in a loosely-coupled environment.
Traditional Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is inadequate for the authorization management of composite services since the administration of the component
web services has not been taken into consideration. In
this paper, we propose a novel conceptual model, named
as Service Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC) to
facilitate the administration and management for both
service consumers and component web services. A set
of administrative functions are also provided for managing the elements of SOAC. This research will be the
ﬁrst step towards managing service-oriented authorization.
Keywords: Authorization, Conceptual Model, Web
Services, Role Based Access Control.
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1. Complicated Coordination on Authorization Constraints: Each web service in Tom &
Brothers or other part suppliers bears speciﬁc authorization constraints to restrict the access on
its operations. The Order Service is a composite web service and its operations are supported
by multiple component web services provided by
other part suppliers. It is not enough to enforce
the authorization constraints of the Order Service
without considering the characteristics of these
component services. For example, in Fig. 1, the
operation (1)-Order Engine is supported by the
component web services A, B and C from other
organizations that can provide engine. Hence,
without properly handling the authorization constraints of the component web services, the Tom
& Brothers can not ensure if the authorization to
access the speciﬁc Order Service’s operations can
be supported. For instance, if the authorization
to access the Order Engine operation has been
assigned to a speciﬁc service consumer, but Tom
& Brothers fails to obtain the authorization from
the other component web services, then the operation can not be enacted and the unnecessary
disclosure of Order Engine operation is occurred.
This is the result of lack of coordination on the
authorization constraints in Order Service and its
supporting component web services. Therefore,
granting the access on the Order Service to a service consumer needs to consider not only the service consumers but also the component services.
We should not only understand ”who should do
what?”, but also need to know ”who should do
what under what conditions”.

Introduction

Web service technologies provide a technical foundation for seamlessly composing individual component
web services into a cohesive one [1]. However, how to
manage the access on the composite web service becomes a challenge in loosely-coupled environment.
Let us look at an example. Tom & Brothers is a
vehicle parts dealer which can provide vehicle engines,
engine accessories, etc, for both military and civil use.
An Order Service is set up in Tom & Brothers including ﬁve operations: (1) Order Engine, (2) Order Engine
Accessory, (3) Payment, (4) Payment Veriﬁcation and
(5) Logistics (See Fig. 1). Note, the Logistics operation
is not available to the military customers since they organize the parts shipment by themselves. When receiving a part order from a customer, the Tom & Brothers
will order the parts from various other parts suppliers.
As soon as the payment has been veriﬁed, the goods
will be transported to the customer.
978-0-7695-4126-6/10 $26.00 © 2010 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/SCC.2010.13

2. Dynamicity of Service Environment: Web
services are autonomous and interact with each
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other in a loosely-coupled environment. Many
web services are composed of component services
in a highly dynamic manner. For example, if a
component service changes its authorization constraints from asking Tom & Brothers for professional engineer certiﬁcate to requiring sales representative qualiﬁcation, then all the service operations in Tom & Brothers that can be supported
by the component web service need to update their
identiﬁcations on the component service’s authorization constraints. Moreover, there are huge
amounts of web services that can provide the same
or similar operations. For example, in Fig. 1, component services A, B, and N can all support the
same type of engine accessories to Tom & Brothers. Hence, if the changes occur frequently and/or
happen in thousands of web services, then an eﬃcient way to administrate these changes is needed.
At this stage, the dynamicity of web Service impedes the eﬃciency of service-oriented authorization management.

Service) needs to deal with not only a large number
of users (service consumers) but also great amounts of
resources (component services). Moreover, the characteristics of these resources are diﬀerent from that of
objects of RBAC in close systems. These resources
do not belong to the concerned system, but the system can reach their requirements and provided operations. Hence, traditional RBAC is not suitable for
the service-oriented authorization management since it
has not taken the Resource into account. Note the Resource particulary can not be fully controlled in the
context of service environment.
All existing role-based models in web service
paradigm have not brought the administration of resource into the picture. Actually, the quantity of resources can be very large and they can be prone-tochange, which should be considered in web service authorization. In research work [4, 6, 7], roles are assigned to service consumers for service authorization.
However all these researches have not put the resource
into the picture or they simply employ an unrealistic
assumption that there is a global coordination on internal authorization policies of each autonomous web
services to enforce the access control in service composition.
In this paper, we propose an innovative conceptual
model for authorization of web services, named as Service Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC). The conceptual model will handle the web service authorization
by dealing with not only a large number of service consumers, but also huge amounts of resources. Authorization constraints of the component web service and
its supported composite web service are integrated together for making authorization decision to a service
consumer. Furthermore, administrative functions are
also presented to enforce the web service authorization
from a system perspective.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the conceptual model with the major features and detailed speciﬁcations. Section 3 discusses
the administrative functions. Section 4 overviews some
related work. Concluding remarks and discussion of future work are presented in Section 5.

3. Conﬂict of Interest:
There are diﬀerent kinds of conﬂicts of interest
which are crucial in the authorization of composite web services. For example, when there is a
conﬂict of interest between a speciﬁc service consumer and a speciﬁc component service, the Order
Service in Tom & Brothers should not be authorized to the service consumer when this component
service is needed in the composite service, e.g.,
USA military customers have a conﬂict of interest with a component web service from a Chinese
part supplier. Actually, the conﬂicts of interest
associated with characteristics of component services have not been touched in existing research
about web services authorization.
Therefore, an eﬀective management on serviceoriented authorization by coordinating the constraints
in diﬀerent web services is needed. Role Based Access
Control (RBAC) [2] is a widely accepted approach to
restrict system access to authorized users. In RBAC,
users acquire permissions through their roles rather
than they are assigned permissions directly. This
greatly reduces the administrative overhead associated
with individual users and permissions.
However, web services technologies facilitate the integration of the loosely-coupled distributed applications. There may be a large amount of component
web services which are used as resources to support
the composite web service’s operations. The quantity
of service consumers can also be large. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the system of the composite web service (Order

2

Conceptual Model of Service Oriented Authorization Control

We propose a novel conceptual model, named as Service Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC) for managing the access on the composite web service (See
Fig. 2). Based on the proposed conceptual model,
the elements of service authorization and their internal relationships can be systematically described. We
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thorization constraints and can provide same support
to the composite web service. From the motivating example, the Order Engine operation in Tom & Brothers requires the support from the resource type named
as Engine Supplier that contains the component web
services A, B, and C which can provide engine (See
Fig. 1). Obviously, one resource type can include multiple resources, and vise versa.
The reasons to introduce the resource type in SOAC
are: (1) the authorization to a service consumer to access the composite web service’s operations relies on
not only the proﬁle of the service consumer but also
the characteristics and authorization constraints of the
component web services; (2) resource type is more constant compared with individual resources. It is easy for
the composite web service to map its operations with
resource type than individual resource which are dynamic in loosely-coupled environment. For example,
if one resource changes its authorization constraints
to be in another resource type, then the composite
web service only need to transfer the resource from
this resource type to another one. It is not necessary to change the relationship between the resource
types and the supported composite web service’s operations. Without resource type, the composite web
service has to update all relationships between this resource and the involved composite service’s operations.
If the change is frequent and the aﬀected resources and
operations are countless, then the workload to specify the change individually will be huge. Therefore,
resource type is particularly necessary in service oriented environment where the resources are thousands
and very dynamic, and the relationships between the
resources and their supported operations are looselycoupled.

Figure 1. Order Service in Tom & Brothers

develop the SOAC conceptual model by using the notation of Entity-Relationship (E-R) Diagram. In
Fig. 2, the rectangles represent the elements and the
diamonds illustrate the relationships.

2.1

Features of Service Oriented Authorization Control

In SOAC, the authorization management concerns
two parts as service provision part (See grey rectangle
in Fig. 2) and service realization part (See white rectangle in Fig. 2). In service provision part, the concept
of Role is employed for handling with the administration and management of proﬁles of service consumers.
A role will be assigned to a speciﬁc service consumer to
gain certain permissions for accessing the operations of
the composite web service, if the service consumer can
satisfy the authorization constraints of the composite
web service. For example, a web service consumer can
be identiﬁed as USA military customer to obtain permissions to access all operations of the Order Service
in Tom & Brothers except the Logistics operation, if it
bears the certiﬁcation from Pentagon. In a summary,
role in SOAC is used to encapsulate a group of web
service consumers that can satisfy the common authorization constraints of the composite web service.
Following the same philosophy of roles for service
consumer’s proﬁles, the conceptual model introduces
Resource Type to deal with the large number of the
component services (resources). In service realization
part, the design of resource type is based on the characteristics and authorization constraints of the component services. In SOAC, resource type is used to
represent a group of resources that bear common au-

2.2

Speciﬁcation of Service Oriented Authorization Control

In this section, we introduce the speciﬁcation of
SOAC from three perspectives, (1) service provision
part, (2) service realization part, and (3) integration of
these two parts.
2.2.1

Speciﬁcation of Service Provision Part

A typical authorization constraint of the composite web
service requires that only the service consumer that can
fulﬁll the composite service’s constraints, e.g., bearing speciﬁc credential, can be assigned with speciﬁc
roles to gain the permissions to access the operations of
the composite web service (See Constraint enacted between the elements of Role (R) and Service Consumer
(SC) in Fig. 2). In Fig. 2, we deﬁne service consumer
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as the element that requires to access the composite
web service’s operations. To avoid confusion between
the accessed composite web service’s operation with
the element of Operation used in traditional RBAC,
we introduce a new element-function to represent the
composite web service’s operations. The function can
be represented by one composite service’s operation or
several operations. Since there is only one type of permission for service consumer to act on the composite
web service’s function in service environment - ”execute the function”, we ignore the permission in SOAC.
Since service consumer is prone to change, and its
quantity is vary large, directly specifying the assignment of function to individual service consumer needs
tedious administration eﬀort. In SOAC conceptual
model, we follow the philosophy of RBAC to have the
more constant concept-role to encapsulate the service
consumers which can fulﬁll the common authorization
constraints of the composite web service. A role will
be assigned to each service consumer based on its characteristics (typically a credential that service consumer
submits to the composite web service). Each role binds
with a group of functions that can be accessed. The
roles guarantee that the composite web service’s functions can only be accessed by the qualiﬁed service consumers as speciﬁc roles. In a summary, what we are
concerned in SOAC is "who should act on what as
what kind of role". Here below, we present the formal deﬁnition of service provision part of SOAC.

Figure 2. Service Oriented Authorization
Control (SOAC) Conceptual Model

2.2.2

Speciﬁcation of Service Realization Part

When a composite web service receives the authorization request from a service consumer, at ﬁrst it needs to
conﬁrm if the realization of the required functions can
be supported by speciﬁc type of the component web
service, i.e., resources. Due to the feature of Dynamicity of the component web service, it is unrealistic for
the composite service to specify the relationships between the resources and the supported composite web
service’s function individually, if the resources and the
functions are numerous. Hence, the concept resource
type is introduced in SOAC. The resource type is a
set of resources deﬁned by the composite service after
identifying the characteristics and authorization constraints of the resources (See Fig.2). The composite
web service can bear multiple resource types that include many resources. The resource therefore can be
used to support the function if the function is mapped
with the resource type that contains the corresponding resource. The resource type can contain the resources if the authorization constraints of the resources
can be satisﬁed by the resource type and the support
that the resource can provide is what the resource
type needs (See Constraint between the elements of
Resource Type (ReT) and Resource (Re) in Fig. 2).
Here below, we present the formal deﬁnition of service
realization part of SOAC.

Deﬁnition 1 The service provision part of SOAC includes:
• SC, R ,and F are elements representing Service
Consumer, Role, and Function.
• SCA ⊆ SC × R, a many-to-many relation to map service consumer to role assignment. Formally, ∀sc ∈SC, ∀r∈R, (sc , r)∈SCA ⇒
sc .credential = r.credential, where the credential that the service consumer submits is consistent
with the credential that the role requires.
• assigned sc:(r:R) → 2SC , the mapping of role
r onto a set of service consumers. Formally, assigned sc(r)={sc ∈SC|(sc , r)∈SCA}.
• PFA ⊆F×R, a many-to-many relation to map
function to role assignment.
• assigned fun:(r:R) → 2F , the mapping of
role r onto a set of functions. Formally, assigned fun(r)={f ∈F | (f, r) ∈PFA}.

Deﬁnition 2 The service realization part of SOAC includes:
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• F, ReT, and Re are elements representing Function, Resource Type, and Resource.

enacted between the elements of Service Consumer
(SC) and Role (R) shown in Fig. 2: ”only service consumer that can satisfy the authorization constraints
of the composite service can be assigned as speciﬁc
role”. On the other hand, Condition (2) is used to restrict the relationships between Resource Type (ReT)
and Resource (Re). It states that the resource type
can only include the resource whose authorization constraints can be satisﬁed by the resource type. Furthermore, condition (3) emphasizes that the function that
the resource type can support should be what the role
needs to access (See Constraint among the relationships between the elements of Role (R), Function (F)
and Resource Type (ReT) in Fig. 2). For instance,
if the function that a service consumer needs to access
represents Order Engine operation in Tom & Brothers,
then the resource type deployed in SOAC should be
Engine Suppler that can logically support the function, i.e. the resource type includes the speciﬁc resources that can provide engine to Tom & Brothers.
In Fig. 2, another element Session is introduced in
SOAC to integrate the two parts of SOAC together at
runtime. There are two types of sessions in SOAC, Independent session (ISe) and Compound session (CSe).
When service consumer starts to send message to the
composite web service by using its functions with speciﬁc assigned roles, the service consumer and its activated roles are included in one independent session.
When the message arrives at the composite web service,
the composite service thereby needs to use the supporting resources for processing the message. We believe
that the resource type is activated when the message is
passed from the composite web service to the speciﬁc
resources that belong to the resource type. At that
time, a compound session is created by combining the
resource type and supported function with the corresponding service consumer and activated role. Note,
the resource type and the supported function can not
be included in the independent session, since a composite web service can not use the resource type without
receiving the message from the service consumer. Here
below we present the formal deﬁnition of Session at
integration of two parts in SOAC.

• SFA ⊆ F × ReT, a many-to-many relation to
map function to resource type.
• assigned ret:(ret:ReT) → 2F , the mapping of
resource type ret onto a set of functions. Formally, assigned ret(ret)={f ∈F|(f, ret)∈SFA}.
• RTA ⊆Re×ReT, a many-to-many relation to
map resource to resource type. Formally, ∀re∈Re,
∀ret∈ReT, (re, ret)∈RTA ⇒ re.constraint =
ret.constraint, where the constraint that restricts
the access on the resource is consistent with the
constraint that the resource type can fulﬁll.
• assigned re:(ret:ReT) → 2Re , the mapping of
resource type ret onto a set of resources. Formally,
assigned re(ret)={re∈Re|(re, ret)∈RTA}.
2.2.3

Speciﬁcation of Integration of Two Parts
in SOAC

In previous two sub sections, we have introduced the elements and their relationships in service provision part
and service realization part of SOAC. These two parts
are logically correlated with each other and are required to be integrated together at runtime for serviceoriented authorization.
In Fig. 2, the mappings between the elements of Role
(R), Function (F) and Recourse Type (ReT) logically
integrate the service provision part and service realization part together. Hence, the access on the composite web service can be assigned to service consumer
if the constraints of the composite web service and its
resources can both be satisﬁed, i.e., the service consumer in service provision part can be assigned with a
speciﬁc role to access the functions if the corresponding functions can be supported by the relative resource
type which includes speciﬁc resources in service realization part. We summarize the authorization rules in
Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 Authorization to access the composite web
service’s functions can be granted to service consumer
in service composition if:
(1) The service consumer can satisfy the authorization
constraints of the composite web service.
(2) The resource type can satisfy the authorization constraints of the resources (the component web services).
(3) The functions that the role needs to access can be
logically supported by the resource type.

Deﬁnition 3 The integration of two parts in SOAC
includes:
• Session includes two types, Independent Session
(ISe) and Compound Session (CSe), where:
– Independent Session (ISe) is used by service consumer sc to map the set of activated
roles {r1 ..rj }, j≥1.
– Compound Session (CSe) is used by a
group of service consumer and function <

Here below we introduce each condition of Lemma 1
in detail. In condition (1), it stresses the constraints
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sc , f >, where service consumer sc requires
to access the functions of the composite web
service f, to map a set of activated roles and
resource types {< r1 , ret1 >..< rj , retk >},
where:

Table 1. Service Provision Administrative Operation - SP − AO
SP − AOele
(1) AddServiceConsumer(serviceConsumer:NAME)
(2) DeleteServiceConsumer(serviceConsumer:NAME)
(3) AddRole(role:NAME)
(4) DeleteRole(role:NAME)
(5) AddFunction(funtion:NAME)
(6) DeleteFunction(funtion:NAME)
SP − AOrela
(7) AssignServiceConsumer(serviceConsumer,role:NAME)
(8) ResignServiceConsumer(serviceConsumer,role:NAME)
(9) GrantFunctionAccess(function,role:NAME)
(10) RevokeFunctionAccess(function,role:NAME)

◦ r1 ..rj , j≥1, is a subset of roles assigned
to and activated by the speciﬁc service
consumer sc .
◦ ret1 ..retk , k≥1 is a subset of resource
type assigned and activated to support the
speciﬁc function f.
• Service Consumer Independent Session:
SCSi:(sc :SC)→2ISe , the mapping of service consumer sc onto a set of independent sessions ISe.

All the data types and operations used in the formal
speciﬁcation are deﬁned in SOAC deﬁnition in previous Section. NAME is an abstract data type used to
represent the identiﬁers of the elements in SOAC.

• Service Consumer Compound Session:
SCSc : (sc : SC)→ 2CSe , the mapping of service consumer sc onto a set of compound sessions
CSe.

3.1

• Role Independent Session: RSi:(sei :ISe)→
2R , the mapping of independent session sei onto a
set of roles.

Administrative

There are three elements in service provision part of
SOAC-Service Consumer (SC), Role (R), and Function (F), and two relationships among the elementsAssign and Grant (See grey rectangle in Fig. 2). Hence,
SP − AO are separated into two aspects SP − AOele
and SP − AOrela to manage the elements and relationships respectively.
The operations (1)∼(6) (See Table. 1) are
SP − AOele used to add and delete elements in
service provision part. Due to space limit, we only
take the operation (4) as example. In operation (4),
an existing role is deleted. If the role is activated by
the speciﬁc service consumer in independent session or
compound session, then the associated session should
be deleted ﬁrstly. Furthermore, the mapping functions
and relations associated with the deleted role also
need to update to erase the eﬀect of this role. Then
the role can be deleted from the set R.

• Role Compound Session: RSc : (sec : CSe) →
2R , the mapping of compound session sec onto a
set of roles.
• Function Session: FS(f:F)→2CSe , the mapping
of function f onto a set of compound session CSe.
• Resource Type Session:RTS(sec :CSe) →2ReT ,
the mapping of compound session sec onto a set of
resource types.

3

Service
Provision
Operation- SP − AO

Administrative Functions of SOAC

In this section, we present the administrative functions of SOAC to outline the semantics of various administrative operations. They are required for maintaining the SOAC conceptual model components, e.g.,
the element sets and relations. We also take the Session into consideration to manage the activation of the
speciﬁc elements. Three categories of administrative
operations are presented: (1) Service Provision Administrative Operation (SP − AO); (2) Service Realization Administrative Operation (SR − AO); and (3)
Session Administration Operation (SE − AO). The
notation used to formalize the administrative operations is basically a subset of the Z notation. The representation schema in the formal speciﬁcation of the
administrative operations is:

(4) DeleteRole(role:NAME)
role∈R;
[∀ sei ∈ISe • role ∈ RSi(sei )⇒
DeleteIndependentSession(sei )];
[∀ sec ∈CSe • role ∈ RSc(sec )⇒
DeleteCompoundSession(sec )];
SCA’=SCA\{sc:SC • sc→ role};
assigned sc’=assigned sc\
{role→assigned sc(role)} ;

Schema−N ame(Declaration)  P redicate; ...; P redicate .
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PFA’=PFA\{f:F • f → role};
assigned fun’=assigned fun\
{role→assigned fun(role)};
R’=R\{role};

Table 2. Service Realization Administrative
Operation - SR − AO
SR − AOele
(11) AddResourceType(resourceType:NAME))
(12) DeleteResourceType(resourceType:NAME)
(13) AddResource(resource:NAME)
(14) DeleteResource(resource:NAME)
SR − AOrela
(15) SupportFunction(function,resourceType:NAME)
(16) AbandonFunction(function,resourceType:NAME)
(17) ContainResource(resource,resourceType:NAME)
(18) ExcludeResource(resource,resourceType:NAME)

The operations (7)∼(10) (See Table. 1) are
SP − AOrela used to add and delete relationships in
service provision part. For example, Operation (9) are
used to create the relationships between the elements
of Role (R) and Function (F).
(9) GrantFunctionAccess(function,role:NAME)
function∈F; role∈R;
PFA’=PFA∪{function→role};
assigned fun’=assigned fun\
{role→assigned fun(role)}∪
{role→(assigned fun(role)∪{function})};

3.2

Service Realization
Operation- SR − AO

which represents the activated roles and resource types
included in this new compound session. The mapping
functions SCSc(serviceConsumer) and FS(function)
are also updated to reﬂect the new compound session.
Finally, the RSc(sec ) and RTS(sec ) are updated to
point to the activated roles and resource types from
the compound session sec .

Administrative

There are also three elements included in SR − AOFunction (F), and Resource Type (ReT), and Resource (Re). However, the element of function has
already mentioned in previous sub section. We only
introduce the two elements left in SR − AOele . Moreover, two relationships-Support and Contain are included in SR − AOrela (See white rectangle in Fig. 2).
Operations (11)∼(14) (See Table. 2) are used to create and delete elements of resource type and resource.
They follow the same rules enacted in SP − AOele .
Operations (15)∼(18) (See Table. 2) aim to create
and delete the relationships-Support and Contain in
service realization part by using the same rules in
SP − AOrela .

3.3

Session

Administrative

(21) CreateCompoundSession
(serviceConsumer,function:NAME;
ars:2N AM E ;sec :CSe)
serviceConsumer∈SC; function∈F;
ars⊆{(role:R, resourceType:Ret)|
(serviceConsumer→role)∈SCA,
(function→resourceType)∈SFA};
/
CSe’=CSe∪{sec };
sec ∈CSe;
SCSc’=SCSc\
{serviceConsumer→SCSe(serviceConsumer)}∪
{serviceConsumer→
(SCSe(serviceConsumer)∪{sec })};
FS’=FS\{function→FS(function)}∪
{function→(FS(function)∪{sec })};
RSc=RSc’∪{sec →ars}; RTS=RTS’∪{sec →ars};

Operation-

SE − AO
SE − AO is used to maintain the element of
Session and associated relationships, which reﬂects
the activation of the corresponding elements. Four
commands are developed in SE − AOele based on the
creation and deletion of two types of Session (See
Operations (19)∼(22) in Table. 3). The operations
(23)-(34) are SE − AOrela used to maintain (add
and delete) the six relationships associated with the
element of session (See Fig. 2). Due to space limit, we
do not list the twelve operations of SE − AOrela in
Table 3. Let us take the operation (21) as an example
to illustrate the SE − AO. Operation (21) is used to
create a compound session. Firstly, an ars is created

4

Related Work

In [2, 3], a basic Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
model is presented. The security policy in RBAC
does not directly grant permissions to users but to
appropriate roles. However, traditional RBAC model
is only suitable for authorization management within
individual organization. In RBAC, the resource that
is required to support the function is not considered,
since it is assumed as a constant concept, which quantity is small, and can be ﬁxed in advance and less
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changed. However, in loosely-coupled environment, resource that is needed to support the function spreads
across-organizational boundary and is composed in
highly dynamic fashion. Hence, the dynamicity of resource in service environment makes the authorization
management complicated. Research has been done in
service composition security by enhancing RBAC. We
shall look into some representative works in the area .
In [4, 5], the authors provide an enforcement and
veriﬁcation approach to guarantee that a service choreography can be successfully implemented between a
set of web services (service consumer and composite
web service), based on their authorization constraints.
However, the paper did not mention how to manage
the access control after the authorization constraints
of the composite web service are satisﬁed. The authorization constraints of the supporting resources are
totally ignored.
The authors in [6, 7] propose an approach to correlate the local role issued by the individual component
service with the global role generated from the composite services. However, the ”role” as a concept used
by speciﬁc service to manage the authorization is part
of internal security policy within each web service and
can not be identiﬁed by the other services. Hence, the
mapping of the global role with the local role is not realistic. In SOAC, we introduce the resource type (ReT)
as the composite web service’s acknowledgment on the
public authorization constraints of the resources.
Although plenty of existing enhanced RBAC mechanisms and approaches have been presented which focus on managing access control in service composition,
they are still insuﬃcient in: (1) missing the administration of the resources in service-oriented authorization; (2) ignoring the dynamicity of service environment where the composite web service is composed of
resources based on-demand; (3) hard coding the roles
issued from resources and composite service together.
In this paper, we present an innovative conceptual
model, SOAC, to manage the service-oriented authorization. The merits of SOAC lie in: (1) the coordination of the authorization constraints of composite web
services and component web services; and (2) the introduction of the more constant concepts of role and
resource type to represent the concepts of service consumer and resource which are dynamic and volatile.

5

Table 3. Session Administrative Operation SE − AO
SE − AOele
(19) CreateIndependentSession
(serviceConsumer:NAME;ars:2N AM E ;sei :NAME)
(20) DeleteIndependentSession
(serviceConsumer,sei :NAME)
(21) CreateCompoundSession
(serviceConsumer,function:NAME;
ars:2N AM E ;sec :NAME)
(22) DeleteCompoundSession
(serviceConsumer,function,sec :NAME)

consumers and component web services. A novel conceptual model has been developed for managing the
service-oriented authorization in the loosely-coupled
environment of web services. Beyond the existing approaches for web services authorization, our approach
considers the authorization constraints of the component web services explicitly. Three categories of administrative functions of SOAC are also proposed.
In the future, we will develop mechanisms to elaborate the causes and solutions regarding to conﬂicts
of interest in web service authorization. Detailed and
formalized authorization constraints in SOAC and a
context-aware extension will also be studied.
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Conclusion and Future Work

This research work provides an extension of classical RBAC approach with the capability to address
the authorization issues of the composite web service,
brought in by the large number of dynamic service
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